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Infrastructure, planning and the 
command of time 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Governments in many countries have sought to accelerate the time taken to make 
decisions on major infrastructure projects, citing problems of ‘delay’. Despite this, rarely 
has the time variable been given careful empirical or conceptual attention in decision-
making generally, or in infrastructure decision-making specifically. This paper addresses 
this deficit by analysing decision-making on two categories of major infrastructure in the 
UK – transport and electricity generation – seeking both to generate better evidence of 
the changes to decision times in recent decades, and to generate insights from treating 
time as  resource and tracking its (re)allocation. We find that reforms introduced since 
2008 have done relatively little to alter overall decision times, but that there are marked 
and revealing changes to the allocation of time between decision-making stages. While 
public planning processes have their time frames tightly regulated, aspects led by 
developers (e.g. pre-application discussion) are not; arranging finance can have a bigger 
effect on project time frames, and central government retains much flexibility to manage 
the flow of time. Speed-up reforms are also sectorally uneven in their reach. This 
indicates how arguments for time discipline falter in the face of infrastructure projects 
that remain profoundly politicised. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Almost since its inception, the various processes of the planning system have been 
criticised for being too slow, whether that is the time taken to prepare land use plans 
(Kitchen 2007), or to determine planning applications (Dobry 1975; Booth 2002). With 
such criticisms have come calls for speeding up these processes. However, since the 
1990s these discourses have come to exert more significant influence on decision-making 
procedures for major infrastructure. Narratives of ‘delay’ to ‘nationally significant 
infrastructure’ have been used to rationalise a whole suite of institutional changes: 
towards procedural streamlining, fixed time schedules and the curtailment or staging of 
opportunities for public engagement. Such trends can be observed in a variety of 
countries (see Marshall 2012, 2014a, Cowell and Owens 2006). 
 
However, the pervasiveness of these discourses and reforms exposes the relatively 
limited, unsophisticated attention given to the time variable in decision-making analyses. 
Certainly, there is an ongoing interest in time management as a facet of performance 
management (Allmendinger 2011), but the temporal organisation of planning has only 
sporadically been examined (Booth 2002; Marshall 2002). Although complaints about 
‘delay’ permeate debates about infrastructure decision-making (e.g. Gibson and Howsam 
2013; Hyder Consulting 2013), the evidence of delay in planning procedures used to 
justify reforms is often limited, ambiguous and selective (Booth 2002; Hemming 2012; 
Levett 2007a, b). More fundamentally, ‘delay’ is never defined. Meanwhile the numerous 
critics of streamlining reforms tend to highlight the democratic and environmental risks, 
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but rarely follow up how with careful analysis of how time is actually re-allocated across 
decision-making processes, and with what effects. 
 
This paper contributes to these debates in two main ways. The first component is to 
present an empirical analysis of what has happened to the decision times for major 
infrastructure in the UK since the 1980s, looking in particular at the effects of reforms 
enacted since 2008. This is informed by the second component, which begins developing 
a more nuanced conceptual perspective on time within decision-making, in particular to 
tease out the merits of treating time as a resource. We adapt elements of Flyvbjerg’s 
questions for phronetic social science research by asking: what is happening to the 
allocation of time, which elements or arenas are most susceptible to time management 
and which escape it and, tentatively in this paper, who gains and who loses from these 
trends and how do they reveal the play of power (Flyvbjerg 2004).  
 
We focus our analysis on the UK, as it offers a particularly resonant setting for exploring 
these issues. The UK typifies the trends in policy and discourse outlined above. 
Moreover, the UK’s  measures to accelerate infrastructure decision times  are seen as an 
exemplar by the Commission of the European Union, which has utilised it in its own 
proposals for procedural streamlining on ‘projects of European significance’ (European 
Commission 2011; Marshall 2014b).  
 
The next section of the paper reviews potential explanations for this increased political 
attention to decision-time acceleration for major infrastructure, before outlining the 
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potential for analysing time as a resource and the pitfalls of measurement. The insights 
derived are then applied to two sectors – transport infrastructure and electricity 
generating stations – in which decision time data is presented. The final sections discuss 
the significance of the findings, interpreting the patterns revealed and their implications, 
and make recommendations for further research. 
 
 
2.0 Planning, decision-making and the question(s) of time 
 
2.1 Drivers and debates 
 
Concerns to accelerate decision-making for ‘major infrastructure’ started attracting 
serious discussion from the 1970s, a period in which the time horizons for deciding on, 
inter alia, new electricity generating stations appeared to be inexorably extending 
(Owens 1985). For much of the following decades, however, serious efforts to reform 
infrastructure decision-making processes foundered on countervailing concerns about 
democratic accountability, legitimacy and public engagement (Cowell and Owens 2006). 
To follow Wood and Flinders (2014), a logic of discipline (that procedures should be put 
in place to accelerate decision-making) was contained by logics of democracy. However, 
from about 2000 onwards in the UK, reform became not just thinkable but actionable 
(DTLR 2001a, 2001b), and an intensification of discourses of delay are a prominent 
dimension of this shift. As the Secretary of State said in announcing initial reform 
proposals in July 2001: 
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 “At present, slow and cumbersome decision-making processes can mean delay and 
uncertainty for everyone concerned. Much needed infrastructure improvements can 
be unnecessarily delayed – affecting people’s lives on an everyday basis” (DTLR 
2001b p 11).  
 
The same phrases kept recurring in subsequent years. For example the Barker Report on 
land use planning is peppered with references to planning delay, stating for example, that 
“Taking a major infrastructure project through to planning inquiry and eventual decision 
can be a very lengthy process. Over 50 percent of power station applications that have 
gone to inquiry since 1990 have taken at least two and a half years to gain approval, 
while large transport cases can take several years” (Barker 2006 p 69).  Reports 
proceeding simultaneously on transport concluded thus: “it is clearly a view shared by 
many – that the system has evolved over several decades to the point at which it can 
impose unacceptable cost, uncertainty and delay on all participants and the UK more 
broadly” (Eddington 2006, p 56; see also White 2014). 
 
Discourses of delay informed major reforms, enacted in the UK by the Planning Act 2008 
(and amended by the Localism Act 2011), in which steps to contain the duration of 
decision-making processes featured prominently. Fixed time schedules were introduced 
for key decision-making stages for specific infrastructure categories, replacing previous 
procedures, such as local public inquiries, the duration of which was not regulated a 
priori (see Table 1). Reforms also introduced National Policy Statements (NPS), 
designed to specify and emphasise the ‘need’ for the infrastructure categories concerned 
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and thereby prevent such ‘generic’ or ‘policy issues’ being contested at successive 
project-specific inquiries (DECC 2011). The idea of expediting decisions by splitting 
‘generic’ from ‘project-specific’ concerns had been circulating in the UK for decades (see 
Lee et al 2013), but was now introduced. At the same time, the reforms also required that 
developers meet specific requirements for public and stakeholder consultation prior to 
submitting an application – the pre-application stage.  
 
[Insert Table 1 somewhere near here] 
 
The timing of this policy shift itself sheds some light on the drivers. It is hard to interpret 
the reforms as straightforward policy learning, given the degree of contestation they 
attracted. An emphasis on procedural speed has long been regarded as a simplistic way of 
judging the quality of decision-making (Booth 2002). The centralising and streamlining 
thrust of reforms to infrastructure decision-making processes has been criticised for 
curtailing opportunities for effective public engagement and for the assumptions made 
about (central) government omniscience (for example, Owens 2004; Lee et al 2013; 
Woolley 2010). Indeed, infrastructure decision-making has often been challenged for its 
struggle accurately to gauge costs and benefits (e.g. Sovacool and Cooper 2013; 
Flyvbjerg et al 2003), leading to recommendations that major projects ought to be subject 
to greater democratic oversight and scrutiny, commensurate with the scale of the impacts, 
yet this is not the direction reforms have taken. In most contexts infrastructure decision-
making procedures have been reformulated to inject tighter, central ‘funnelling’ of 
decision-making (Wolsink 2004), leading to closer containment and staging of the scope 
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for debate and scrutiny around specific projects (Lee et al 2013; Brand and Watson 
2013). 
 
More persuasive explanations of why debates about the effectiveness of planning ‘should 
have become hooked on the questions of managerial efficiency’ (Booth 2002, 310) are 
that it represents a reordering of priorities by the state. The main rationale for ‘reducing 
delay’ to infrastructure decision making has long been economic, emanating from 
business interests in particular, arguing that delayed decisions and lengthy public 
inquiries impose an economic cost to the specific developer and economy as a whole 
(Owens 1985). Such pressure has been exercised consistently by the Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI) since at least the early 1990s (Marshall 2012; CBI and KPMG 
2012). The CBI has been unambiguous in its representation of planning: “The 
government should…urgently and radically improve the speed and transparency of the 
planning process.  For major infrastructure projects, the time taken to hold enquiries must 
be radically shortened” (CBI 2000 pages 22-23).   
 
Issues of decision-making time have thus become bound up with cost and effective 
delivery (‘delivering to time and to budget’), over the claims for better deliberation or 
democratic oversight and accountability (Flinders and Wood 2014). Explanations as to 
why such arguments have started to win out for infrastructure points to a convergence of 
developments in the economic sphere, related to conceptions of the politics of 
neoliberalism or neoliberalisation.  One strand in which time is prominent is the 
restructuring of many parts of the Keynesian Welfare State settlement, with “old style” 
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state forms portrayed as cumbersome and inflexible, compared with contemporary 
business practices.  One can therefore see post-2000 developments as an extension of  
New Public Management into the infrastructure consenting sphere (Flynn 2012; 
Allmendinger 2011).  A second strand concerns how governments utilise moments and 
narratives of crisis as opportunities to press for change (Agamben 2005). Climate change 
has amplified such crisis narratives (Kuzemko 2014), and has been used to rationalise the 
urgency of delivering massive investment in low-carbon energy generation over efforts to 
secure broadly-based democratic legitimacy for project decisions (MacKerron 2009; Lee 
et al 2013).Yet moves to accelerate the delivery of infrastructure can be observed in 
many categories of development – in road transport, for example - which can hardly be 
badged as low carbon. A third strand concerns the growing role of the private sector in 
infrastructure provision, including from the privatised utilities. Over time, one can 
observe a wider “financialisation of infrastructure” (O’Neill 2013), whereby new 
financing mechanisms related to private, international equity funds are used ever more 
widely, with fund managers expecting to see equally advantageous or smooth processes 
across different contexts (Hawkey et al 2013), whether for new toll roads, airports or 
energy projects.  In this context, protracted deliberation over projects consents – both 
uncertain duration and uncertain outcomes – is a risk which threatens delivery and adds 
to the price of finance, and which states have found  increasingly difficult to tolerate. 
 
To summarise, while discourses of delays to infrastructure decision making are not new, 
their growing effectiveness in rationalising streamlining reforms can be related to 
increasing emphasis on economic priorities within politics more generally. Such 
 10 
arguments are international in their constitution and reach. A more refined grasp of the 
power and limits of such economic rationalities might be gained if one tracks more 
closely efforts to re-shape the temporality of infrastructure decisions, and their effects. 
 
2.2 Why and how time matters 
 
Seeking in some systematic way to trace the shifting temporalities of infrastructure 
decision-making regimes is an under-developed exercise (though see Owens 1985), yet 
the potential value of doing so is manifold. Most immediately, the presentation of better 
evidence on the time taken for making major infrastructure decisions could generate 
better-informed debate, and help challenge the circulation of casual distortions about 
‘delay’. One might find that reforms justified as delivering swifter decisions may not 
have accelerated the delivery of infrastructure, or that the finger of blame for extending 
time frames has been pointed in the wrong direction. Although much ire has been 
directed at planning, and especially at public inquiries, previous analysts indicate that 
such components are not necessarily the longest part of decision-making process or the 
overall delivery schedule (Owens 1985; Marshall 2002). 
 
From an analytical but also more critical perspective, there is an argument for treating 
time as a resource and tracing its allocation. Infrastructure decision-making regimes may 
seek to order time between stages and arenas of the process but, in turn, such actions have 
distributive implications for different actors. Time is a dimension of the opportunity 
structures for public and interest group engagement in a polity (Kitschelt 1986), in that 
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the capacity of different actors to engage with decision-making processes is affected by 
the time period in which arguments can be assembled and resources raised. Marshall 
(2002, 175) showed how the compressed time schedule introduced for producing 
Regional Spatial Strategies made it difficult for truly bottom-up engagement, while 
advantaging the organised, permanent and well-resourced (mainly, though not entirely, 
business elites). This is not to say that extending timescales invariably benefits less well-
resourced actors. At the protracted inquiry into the Sizewell B nuclear power station, 
environmental organizations found maintaining a presence immensely challenging 
(O’Riordan et al 1988). 
 
There is also the issue of  reach: for which parts of decision-making processes – and, by 
implication, for which actors, issues and sectors – have time scales been regulated and 
compressed, but for which parts is there still flexibility? Can opponents (or perhaps 
proponents) exploit ‘delay’ as a tactic to influence outcomes? How time is allocated and 
used may thus be revealing, not least in terms of the exercise of power between the 
various parties involved in decision-making processes (Flyvbjerg 2001). Tracing the 
allocation of time can also inform debates about politicising and depoliticising forms of 
statecraft (Flinders and Wood 2014), where depoliticisation entails the displacement of 
political activity, ‘typically beyond sites and arenas where it is visible to non-participants 
and hence amenable to public scrutiny’ (Hay 2014, p.302), into technocratic spheres.  
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To recognise that the allocation of time warrants closer attention does not mean that the 
time frames of decision-making processes for major infrastructure are straightforward to 
measure or interpret (see Ball et al 2009; Allmendinger 2011). Three complications arise. 
 
Firstly, ‘infrastructure decision-making processes are not wholly constituted by simple, 
unitary, linear processes, moving from application (by the developer) to consent (by a 
singular public authority). If the time-frame from application to consent is a dominant 
measure of decision times, it neglects the tendency of major infrastructure projects to be 
subjected to many layers of consenting process, including licensing as well as planning 
consent, often proceeding in different arenas (Gibson and Howsam 2013). Indeed, 
coordination of multiple consent procedures is a further strand of decision-making 
streamlining, and a goal advanced by the Planning Act 2008. This multi-strandedness 
makes it hard to attach a block of time to a single purpose. 
 
Secondly, ‘the project’ that is up for determination can have fuzzy boundaries. Projects 
may vary after an application has been made. Allowing modifications to be made to the 
initial application within the consenting procedure may provide useful flexibility to 
developers  but extends decision times, if focused on the application rather than the 
project (Allmendinger 2011; DCLG 2014; White 2013). Similar ambiguities arise about 
how to measure successive, revised applications. Projects may also be intrinsically 
connected, such as the requirement for grid connections entailed by new power stations 
(Glasson et al 1998). As Allmendinger suggests (2011, 120), ‘(m)uch of the process of 
securing an implementable permission lies outside of the formal process’. 
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The third set of complications is that measurement is not a neutral exercise. What is 
measured and the way that data is interpreted can reflect divergent framings of ‘the 
problem’ that infrastructure decision-making processes are meant to resolve. Thus Booth 
(2002) unearthed the Royal Town Planning Institute defining delay as ‘unnecessary time’ 
(House of Commons 1978), but this simply raises the question as to what the necessary 
purposes of decision-making processes are. Problems of interpretation arise from the fact 
that the temporality of decision-making is rarely the only thing being ordered, with issues 
of timing often linked with demarcations of what is open for deliberation and at what 
spatial scale. A good example would be the NPS created in the UK arising from the 
Planning Act 2008 reforms, which seek to define the national need for certain categories 
of infrastructure, and thereby provide a supportive policy basis for determining 
infrastructure projects and a mechanism for containing and staging discussion, with the 
expectation that they can make the determination of individual infrastructure projects 
more efficient. The logic and value of such manoeuvres has been widely questioned 
(Marshall 2002, 172; also Owens 2004), but whether they have the desired effect reflects 
the simultaneous regulation of temporal and discursive boundaries. 
 
The non-neutrality and complexity of tracing decision times also arises from the way in 
which consenting processes, and their temporal form, are always an abstraction from a 
much wider and, often fuzzily bounded set of deliberations about infrastructure projects, 
which unfold across a multiplicity of venues, with varying degrees of openness, often 
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over much longer periods of time than specific, formal decision-making procedures. This 
is true even if we focus on the formal arenas of decision taking (Bachrach and Baratz 
1962); such fuzziness multiplies if we entertain the political assemblage of influence, 
rationality and legitimacy construction by which decisions are made. 
 
This can be illustrated by a set of public debates organised in the south of France on 
various transport and energy schemes as part of the Commission Nationale du Debat 
Public system of early non-binding deliberative processes, now required for all major 
projects. Fourniau et al (2012) analysed the “portée” or reach of those public debates, and 
revealed the complex play of time in a system based on wide and measured public 
deliberation. Public debates have often set off new “configurations” which may create 
new patterns of interest interplay and conceptual framing of a project for years after the 
four-month long debates (see also Hajer 2003). The Omega project, a global study of 
transport mega projects, reached similar conclusions: a prominent recommendation 
related to the importance of giving a project “time to breathe”, in order to generate the 
best chance of achieving truly sustainable and legitimate projects (Omega Centre 2012). 
To advance such recommendations requires a polity in which the broad, societal 
deliberation of projects and their policy context is recognised as a valued and legitimate 
part of decision making, rather than a risk to efficient project delivery.  Whether such 
wider deliberations are measured as part of infrastructure decision times or not also show 
the clear value judgements - whose time matters? what is important? - bound up in the 
issue of measurement. 
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3.0 Methodology 
 
Our analysis now proceeds to two sets of empirical analyses of infrastructure decision-
making times. We focus on transport and energy, in recognition that both infrastructural 
sectors have been of strategic concern, and both have long been subject to special 
decision-making procedures, run by central government. Within each sector we examine 
a set of ‘routine’ projects and those that might be regarded as more exceptional: in 
transport, this is small-scale roads, ports and rail schemes then major airport and rail 
infrastructure respectively; in energy, combined-cycle gas-turbine power stations 
(CCGTs) represent the routine category and nuclear power stations the exceptional. This 
captures an important distinction, as exceptional projects bulk large in the construction of 
narratives of delay, yet may be unrepresentative of infrastructure projects generally.  
 
For each category of infrastructure, we have sought to measure the duration of key stages 
of the decision-making process: particularly the time taken from formal application to 
consent and, within that, the duration of any public inquiry or examination. Where 
possible we have structured the analysis to cast light on the situation prior to and after the 
2008 reforms. Where information is available, we have sought to track the time spent in 
pre-application activities, though this is most readily achievable for post 2008 Act 
processes where pre-application consultation is subjected to greater regulatory oversight 
and documentary evidence. 
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Alongside this application-based account (Allmendinger 2011) of consenting processes, 
we have sought to incorporate parallel and preparatory processes within our analysis 
where possible, to situate the measurement of formal decision times within the wider 
duration of infrastructure project delivery. To do so, requires careful delineation of what 
is under discussion with some risk of inconsistency, but to focus solely on formal 
procedures would be no less distorting.  As noted above, measurement is not a neutral 
exercise and in focusing on formal parts of the consenting process there is a risk of 
reproducing a narrow emphasis on decision-making efficiency. Although the entities we 
seek to measure are inevitably fuzzy and contested, it is still possible to use the results as 
a foundation from which useful insights can be generated about infrastructure decision-
making temporalities and the allocative effects of procedural reforms. 
 
Our primary sources of data for these assessments are documentary, especially decision 
letters produced when consents are issued, which often convey dates for intermediate 
stages and any public inquiry or examination. Our research has also benefited from 
access to two unpublished sources of secondary data: Hemming (2012) and Cowell 
(1995). 
 
 
4.0 Analysis 
 
4.1  Transport cases 
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Here three sets of projects are examined. The first relates to schemes decided under the 
1992 Transport and Works Act regime which governed most schemes from 1992 to the 
coming into force of the 2008 Act, and continues to do so for all schemes below the 2008 
Act thresholds. These are compared with the small number of decisions taken under the 
2008 Act. The other two sets look at major airport and rail schemes. 
 
Transport and Works Act schemes compared to similar schemes under the 2008 Act 
For the period 1992 to 2010, this section draws directly (with the author’s permission) on 
the analysis undertaken by Christine Hemming (2012), in which she analyses the 
Transport and Works Act 1992 (TWA) cases.  The average time from application to 
decision is around two years, and only just over half the cases involved any public 
inquiry (see Table 2). For the cases after 2000, nearly all went to public inquiry but, 
despite this, the average time to decision has been reduced to 1.9 years.  As Figure 1 
shows, the time taken up by public inquiry for the post 2000 cases has been much shorter 
– by just over two months - with the exception of one case where the inquiry took almost 
a year.  The most time-consuming stages are from the application to start of the inquiry, 
averaging over eight months, and the time from inquiry report to decision, averaging 
nearly six months.   
[Insert Table 2 somewhere near here] 
[Insert Figure 1 somewhere near here] 
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For ten transport schemes decided under the 2008 Act the relevant time periods can be 
seen in Figure 2, below.  This does not include the time taken up by judicial review 
challenges, but this only affected one scheme: the Heysham to M6 Link Road; probably 
the only scheme which was highly controversial.   The decision period from application 
to consent was very consistent, ranging from 14 to 16 months.  The pre-application 
consultation is done in phases in different ways in each case, so it is hard to determine the 
exact length. In the M1 junction upgrade extensive consultation took place in 2009 and 
2010, followed by formal pre-application consultation in two phases in 2011 and 2012.  
In the Redditch rail scheme case, there were three phases of formal pre-application 
consultation, lasting from September 2011 to August 2012, but one can either calculate 
this in terms of the whole period (11 months), or include only the formal consultation 
periods (nearer 3-4 months in total). 
[Insert Figure 2 somewhere near here] 
So, although one needs to be careful in generalising from these cases, current experience 
points to a different pattern to that of before the 2008 Act regime, with a slightly shorter 
time period for the core decision period, depending on which parts of the process one 
includes.  This ‘gain’ of up to six months may have been offset in some cases by longer 
phases before the core decision-making period (an issue returned to below when we 
considered gas-fired power stations). In any event, how far this gain of up to six months 
really mattered to the applicants (largely Network Rail and the Highways Agency) is 
unclear. 
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Airport cases 
There have been a number of applications to extend regional airports in the last 20 years, 
but here the focus is just on major projects at three sites. Two projects dominated airport 
questions in the 1990s – Heathrow Terminal 5 and Manchester second runway, whilst the 
new runways at Heathrow and Stansted have been the key zone of debate since the early 
2000s.    
Manchester’s runway took either 42 months or 28 months, depending on whether one 
counts from the submission of the first or second application –illustrating the difficulty of 
capturing decision times for continually evolving projects.  The working-up-time 
beforehand took about three years, and the time to opening after consent was about four 
years.  Opposition to the project was considerable throughout, with campaigns contesting 
the scheme through a nine month public inquiry, and direct action seeking to halt the 
construction long after consent had been given by in January 1997.  Thus there was a 
roughly ten year period from conception to completion.  The 28 months formal 
consenting phase takes up under a quarter of this period, with half of that consisting of 
the post inquiry stage.   
Stansted airport saw two inquiries on major issues.  The G1 inquiry on allowing more air 
movements and passengers lasted five months in 2007, within a process which lasted 
from application to the local council in April 2006 to the Secretary of State granting 
consent in October 2008: thirty months in total.  The G2 application for a second runway 
was submitted in March 2008, but had still not reached public inquiry in May 2010, after 
being called in. It was then withdrawn, given the new government’s clear statement of 
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opposition to the proposal.  If these are considered lengthy timescales, the time dedicated 
to the formal processes was testimony, as at Heathrow, to the inability of pro-
development interests to secure a consensus around the expansion, the strength of the 
opposition (Hayden 2014), and thus to shifting national policy. 
Heathrow Terminal 5 is especially significant as those pressing for streamlined 
consenting seized on it as ideal for the construction of a “delay discourse” from the late 
1990s onwards (Griggs and Howarth 2013), yet Levett (2007b) summarises well the case 
for considering Terminal 5 unique and therefore inappropriate evidence for any reform 
argument.  It was a scheme that had been worked up over many years by the British 
Airports Authority (BAA), and exhibited extreme complexity on many levels. It was this 
complexity, above all, that made the public inquiry and subsequent decision making so 
protracted.  Roy Vandermeer, the Inspector, argued in his subsequent reflections on the 
experience (House of Commons Procedure Committee 2002) that a considerable part of 
the three years and ten months inquiry period resulted from changes either by the 
applicant or in government policy, as the inquiry progressed, due to complex features not 
properly considered in the preparation of the scheme. To this was added the enormously 
controversial nature of the project, making government very nervous about the 
management of the inquiry and the timing of the final consent.  This case is thus in the 
special category of other highly politicised airport expansions, like Schiphol (Huijs 
2011), Frankfurt or Munich, sagas which have run on over several decades.  It can be 
argued that the application to consent phase neatly (some might say properly) matched 
this category status.   
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This argument is bolstered by the experience since 2001 in decision making on 
Heathrow.  The 2000s saw a long period of attempts by BAA and the government to 
grow a case for a third runway, the collapse of this case at the 2010 election, and then a 
new phase of searching for resolution, via the attempt to generate consensus through a 
supposedly cross party device, the Davies Commission, sitting 2012 to 2015.  Heathrow’s 
plans for the third runway were withdrawn days after the election in May 2010, having 
never reached the stage of planning applications, but the contestation had lasted already 
some years, growing out of the 2003 White Paper’s in principle support for this scheme.  
Again, what is quite clear is that lengthy time scales are endemic in any decisions on 
Heathrow expansion.  
Such cases suggest that we are watching societal decision making or legitimacy-
constructing devices, which do not respect precise formulas. The airport cases show 
varied time dynamics, related to the political balance of power and play of arguments, 
which then seem to have conditioned the length of the formal consenting stages, and 
whether in fact these stages were reached at all, rather than the consenting procedures 
themselves exerting determinate effects on time frames. 
 
Major rail schemes 
A striking feature of the reform regime flowing from the 2008 Act is that it has not been 
used for the largest infrastructure scheme now proposed, HS2: a new high-speed railway 
line from London to Birmingham.  That will be decided through a parliamentary Hybrid 
Bill, as were two of the other three schemes to be examined here (see Table 3).  It is not 
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completely clear why the Hybrid Bill route was chosen for the Channel Tunnel Rail Link 
(CTRL) Bill, Crossrail and now HS2. Such procedures are not necessarily swift, and so 
legitimacy construction is almost certainly one motive. Another may be that in such 
highly controversial cases as CTRL (now rebaptised HS1) and HS2, governments may 
feel they have more control over parliamentary progress than in planning processes of 
pre-or post-reform varieties.1 
[Insert Table 3 somewhere near here] 
Reviewing the data in Table 3 shows that in each case, the formal decision-making 
process is only a small segment of the pathway from formulation and announcement to 
completion. Much of this long time period can be attributed to two connected factors: the 
difficult institutional backdrop of rail privatisation and the creation (as became evident) 
of a dysfunctional new regime; and the difficulties of negotiating private funding in this 
period. Consenting processes occupied much less time than financing and related issues. 
Nevertheless, the lengthy time that (say) Crossrail spent going through Parliament is 
striking, given the absence of major opposition to the scheme; one might hypothesise that 
this lengthy time period may have suited government and other interests, in providing 
time to accumulate the diverse funding sources deemed necessary. With Thameslink, 
complexities arising from the diverse impacts of the scheme have helped cause the 
extended time frame, though it too has been affected by financial and organisational 
difficulties. Again, it is hard to read the slow pathway to delivery as the result of the 
chosen consenting regime. 
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The evidence suggests that major railway schemes of this kind, rather like the major 
airport expansions, have their own characteristic time configurations.  HS2 shares these, 
even though the rail system in the UK has arguably “settled in” and a clear decision was 
taken early on that finance would be a state responsibility, removing much of the time 
friction seen in the above three cases.  In spite of that, HS2 only reached Hybrid Bill 
submission stage in November 2013, about five years after the firm commitment to the 
project by government. 
 
4.2 Energy cases 
 
Nuclear power stations: Hinkley C vs Sizewell B 
 
Until Heathrow T5, the inquiry into the nuclear power station Sizewell B was the 
apotheosis of the ‘big inquiry’, sitting and hearing evidence for 340 days between 1982 
and 1985. When nuclear power returned to UK energy policy agendas in the 21st century, 
it is unsurprising that government saw the acceleration of consenting procedures as 
necessary to pave the way (DTI 2007; Hatchwell 2015). Given this connected history, it 
is illustrative to compare the decision times for Sizewell B with its successor – some 25 
years later – at Hinkley C, Somerset, determined under the Planning Act 2008. 
 
As Figure 3 shows, there are broad commonalities in the overall time frames of the two 
projects, but the distribution of time between the component stages is dramatically 
different. For Sizewell B, it is the public inquiry itself that dominates, with a further two 
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years spent writing the inspector’s report. With Hinkley C, key stages of the process – the 
examination, the production of the recommendation and decision – met the statutory time 
frames of the 2008 Act (see Table 1, above), but the period from initial announcement to 
the start of examination, and between examination and (possibly) construction have been 
much longer . Charting the reasons behind these shifting temporalities helps illuminate 
what the 2008 Act reforms have achieved. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 somewhere near here] 
 
Sizewell’s duration can be attributed to the fact that this inquiry, perhaps to a unique 
degree (O’Riordan et al 1988), was deliberately given a broad remit that extended into 
issues of energy policy, including the ‘need’ case for new nuclear, costs, and safety. 
Indeed, issues of need and cost occupied most of the first year; the safety case occupied 
most of the second year, with ‘local planning and environmental considerations’ 
estimated by O’Riordan et al (1988) to occupy no more than 15% of the inquiry’s 
proceedings. With Hinkley C, the 2008 Act procedures required that the examination – a 
nominally equivalent process to the public inquiry, though with greater emphasis on 
written submissions - should be substantially confined to local matters, on the basis that 
wider strategic issues had been settled in the NPS. Indeed, the inspector’s report spent 
most time dealing with issues that could be regarded as site specific (ecology, 
construction traffic, etc) while any strategic issues raised during the examination were 
ruled as ultra vires (see Davey 2013 para 6.6.3(i)). If the 2008 Act process was invoked 
successfully to compress the time frame of the examination, this has clearly not 
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condensed overall time frames. For Hinkley C, much of the time that elapsed between 
first project announcements and consent was occupied by pre-application activities, 
including four stages of formal consultation (White 2013), and the wider issues that were 
partly incorporated into the Sizewell B inquiry were, for Hinkley C, to unfold in other 
venues. 
 
One dimension is the process of establishing the need case for new nuclear power, which 
emerged through successive government policy statements from 2005 (MacKerron 2009) 
and culminated in the NPS for energy, which set down national support for nuclear power 
and listed candidate sites, including Hinkley C. Consultation on the NPS paralleled the 
pre-application stages of Hinkley C. Another dimension is economics. Unlike Sizewell B, 
Hinkley C came forward within a broad policy context that such investments should be 
made by the private sector, but it became clear from the project’s inception that the state 
would have to orchestrate market support arrangements so that external finance for such 
massive and risky investments could be viable. So, years were spent developing new 
arrangements under the auspices of Electricity Market Reform, and a ‘strike price’ for the 
electricity to be supplied by Hinkley C, much of it under contractual secrecy. Subsequent 
to this, the legality of offering such support to nuclear power became the subject of a 
European Commission State Aid inquiry, the decision of which attracted legal challenges 
from the Austrian government and others. 
 
The case of nuclear power shows the difficulties of disentangling specific projects from 
wider supportive policies, yet ignoring these policies and the contestation that surrounds 
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them risks giving a distorted impression of how long project decisions take to assemble. 
Factoring them in suggests a picture in which, for all the reforms and vilification of ‘the 
big inquiry’, the time frame from announcement to realisation for Hinkley C overall have 
proved little different to those for Sizewell B.2 One retort might be that the decision-
times for Hinkley C reflect a whole series of ‘one off’ activities (the NPS, Electricity 
Market Reform, the State Aid inquiry) which, once settled, would not recur, thus 
allowing subsequent projects to be decided more quickly.3 However, this hypothesis 
depends on the wider assumption that nuclear power technologies themselves, and the 
multiple policy landscapes into which nuclear power is embedded, can be kept stable 
over time (O’Riordan et al 1988; Sovacool and Cooper 2013). This did not happen after 
Sizewell B, and it has yet to be demonstrated for successors to Hinkley C. 
 
Comparing CCGT decision-times from 1988 to 2015 
 
The advent of modestly scaled combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) electricity generation 
technologies seemed to reverse the inexorable trend towards lengthier power station 
consenting times seen with coal and nuclear projects through the 1980s (Owens 1985). 
Like all new projects over 50MW in capacity, consents have been issued by central 
government through procedures at one remove from conventional land use planning. To 
that extent, the 2008 Act reforms to the consenting regimes have been a more modest 
adjustment of long-term conventions, executed under the Electricity Act 1989. In terms 
of analysis, CCGT power stations also represent a relatively homogenous form of major 
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infrastructure, being used for over 100 project proposals since the late 1980s, facilitating 
the production of a longer time series.4 The data is set out in Figure 4 below. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 somewhere near here] 
 
The data suggests that there has been little overall change in average decision times from 
application to consent over the decades or, from the more limited data available, since the 
2008 Act reforms. The average time from application to consent is 15 months for 1989 
Act decisions and 16-17 for 2008 Act decisions. Decision times were undoubtedly more 
variable under the 1989 Act: some as little as four months, some over four years.  
Decision-making procedures under the 1989 Act have not been subjected to fixed 
scheduling (see DECC 2007), such that decision times for CCGTs could become lengthy, 
and this has happened principally for two sets of reasons. 
 
One set arises from the interactions between chosen project and chosen site. Most CCGTs 
were consented relatively quickly because they utilised existing industrial or fossil-fuel 
power station sites, thus fomenting little organised opposition. In some cases, however, 
the sites chosen were more controversial or, more often, the side-effects that spilled 
beyond the site – construction traffic, the extraction or discharge of cooling water into 
sensitive ecosystems, or air pollution – attracted the concerns of publics, statutory 
conservation bodies and the local planning authority. Only three CCGTs consented under 
the 1989 Act went to a public inquiry. Where this happened, decision times were longer 
than the average - 31, 28 and 28.5 months - even though the actual inquiry proved short 
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(less than two weeks in each case). The second set of reasons arises from wider policy 
turbulence around the combustion of gas for electricity generation. A number of CCGT 
applications through the 1990s were affected by the crisis in British coal, intensified by 
electricity privatisation, and government reviews of the rapidly expanding use of gas in 
electricity generation. Six consents were issued on 15th November 2000, with ‘decision 
times’ apparently extending up to 44 months. Yet this date coincides with the lifting of 
stricter consenting policy on gas-fired power stations, under which some of these 
applications might have faced refusal (Simmonds 2002). One might say that delay 
allowed consent. Even without the innovation of NPSs, Section 36 procedures for CCGTs 
project decisions have been able to deflect challenges on issues of need. 
 
Only five CCGTs have been consented to date under the 2008 Act at the time of writing 
(August 2015), but these begin to show that time is now disposed quite differently across 
the various stages of the decision-making process, especially pre-application. Under the 
1989 Act, pre-application consultation was left to the discretion of developers and proved 
highly variable, shaped to some extent by EIA scoping and preparation, but with no 
requirements for informing the local planning authority or affected publics, and leaving 
no consistent documentary record. Data gathered by Cowell (1995) from local authority 
planning files for applications submitted between 1988 and 1995 suggest a mean period 
of 5.8 months for pre-application activities.5 The 2008 Act introduced detailed, formal 
requirements for pre-application public and stakeholder consultation, which must be 
approved by the Planning Inspectorate before an application can proceed to examination. 
Nevertheless, the organisation and duration of the pre-application actions can still be 
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considered as under the control of the developer, and are not subject to temporal 
regulation. 
 
Pre-application discussion periods ranged from 9 to 44 months , with a mean of 20.6, 
which suggests that this stage of proceedings is longer than under the 1989 Act.6 One 
plausible explanation is that the reformed arrangements give much greater 
encouragement to developers to improve proposals and satisfy consultees prior to 
application. Under the 1989 Act, such discussions still took place, but would be more 
likely to occur post-application and, moreover, consent officers in central government 
were willing to allow time for further negotiation on impact analysis, mitigation and 
compensation measures that would make the project more acceptable, and appeared to 
treat this as preferable to allowing objections to trigger a public inquiry. One might read 
this as temporal flexibility in the service of good environmental management and 
legitimacy construction, activities which are now concentrated on the pre-application 
stage.  
 
The fragmentation of the decision-making process undoubtedly affects apparent decision 
times for energy projects. Under Section 36, power stations and grid connections have 
been treated as separate applications, even though necessarily connected, with grid 
projects having high potential for controversy. A plangent illustration is the Wilton 
CCGT on Teesside, consented in just four months in 1990, but the 400kV grid line 
enhancements associated with it infringed on a National Park and took seven years to 
consent. This project was subsequently held as an example of planning delays (Barker 
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2006), though it would also be a good example of the limited integration of project 
assessment procedures (Glasson et al 2008).7  
 
 
5.0 Discussion 
 
A key finding is that, across these sectors as a whole, there is limited evidence to suggest 
a major change to the time frames for determining infrastructure projects, with few 
significant signs of reductions since the 2008 Act reforms. For most ‘major infrastructure 
projects’, 18-24 months has been the typical duration of consenting procedures from the 
1990s onwards. There is, however, strong evidence of a redistribution of time between 
different components of decision-making processes, showing an uneven reach to time 
regulation and compression. This is revealing of wider power relations in a number of 
respects. 
 
In terms of what is happening to the allocation of time - which elements or arenas are 
most susceptible to time management? - the research shows that it is planning and 
associated processes like public inquiries that were often the focus of narratives of delay, 
and it is these public-led components of decision-making processes that have been 
subject to greatest temporal regulation. To date, the statutory time-frames of the 2008 
Act, from formal acceptance of an application through to the delivery of a decision, have 
largely been followed. Under this regime, extensive public hearings are now unlikely to 
occur for certain categories of infrastructure. This is partly because of the emphasis on 
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written representations, but also because the regulation of time is linked to a containment 
of the scope for deliberating key policy issues: the introduction of the NPSs may thus 
have gutted the system of most of its more fundamental contestation. 
 
However, closer analysis of previous procedures also shows that, for many infrastructure 
projects, public inquiries were never so frequent or as lengthy as the delay discourse 
might suggest. Moreover, if the Hinkley nuclear power station exemplifies a project 
where the 2008 Act reforms have shortened formal consenting processes, it also shows 
how rendering infrastructure decision-making ‘quicker’ can depend on what is considered 
to be part of the process. The Hinkley experience also supports Jasanoff’s (2007) 
suggestion that where contentious issues are squeezed out of the system in one place (like 
the economic and environmental merits of nuclear power as a means of decarbonising 
energy), democracies may find ways of dealing with them in another (e.g. various levels 
of debate over the National Policy Statements and legal challenges to the EU State Aid 
inquiry decision; Owens and Cowell 2010; see also Crompton 2015). 
 
Preliminary deductions can be made about who gains and who loses from this time 
compression regulation. The business sector were major proponents of the 2008 Act 
reforms, as a device for addressing ‘delay’, and the result has been greater consistency – 
if not necessarily net reduction – in decision times, narrowly construed. How far business 
benefits depends on how one views pre-application consultation. The time duration of 
pre-application consultation is not subject to formal limits, such that developers retain 
discretion here. There are minimum procedural requirements to be met, and analysts 
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recognise a quid pro quo between time spent in pre-application consultation and swift 
formal consenting procedures (White 2013). Moreover, developers can combine time 
spent engaging in such public-facing activities with private decisions, such as checking 
the financial viability of project proposals or choosing between competing investments 
(Gibson and Howsam 2010), and the latter may be more important determinant of overall 
duration. Nevertheless, by 2014 the Government was acknowledging business concerns 
that requirements for pre-application consultation were ‘too lengthy and onerous’ (DCLG 
2014, para 10), and looking at ways to increase the scope for project modification after 
application (White 2013). Pro-developer arguments for temporal flexibility continue to 
exert power. This leads to a broader concluding point, apparent across our two sectors, 
that it is often the time spent organising finance that is the major determinant of 
infrastructure project temporalities, especially for sectors such as nuclear power 
(Hatchwell 2015) and major rail schemes where potentially controversial balances 
between public and private funding must be struck.  
 
Implications for the public and pressure groups require further investigation, though it is 
clear that any such research would need to extend beyond public inquiry arenas, insofar 
as these have been less pivotal in the temporal dynamics of many infrastructure projects 
than criticism of them might suggest. Similarly, the effects of re-casting the temporal 
structure of decision-making needs viewing alongside the effects of streamlining reforms 
on what is open for discussion, where, and the weight given to dissenting views (see 
Rydin et al 2015). If those wishing to contest more fundamental issues of need, 
economics and sustainability are utilising other apertures (Crompton 2015), we need to 
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consider how these may be accessible to very different constellations of organisations and 
publics. 
 
Across the reforms, significant power is retained by Central Government. It has the 
power to consider how delivery and democracy might best be integrated. A key example 
is the 2011 Localism Act, which abolished the independent decision-making body (the 
Infrastructure Planning Commission), and returned decision-taking to Government 
Ministers. Central Government also retains significant flexibility over which sectors to 
apply speed-up regulation. This is revealing in itself. While the Government has been 
swift to impose streamlining reforms across some sectors, for others there remains an 
unwillingness to contain the duration of decision-making, and a retention of flexibility to 
use diverse time-shift devices, such as special commissions, White Papers and various 
forms of Government Bill. The stately progress of major rail schemes HS1, HS2 and the 
airports sagas are witness to this, as was the long delay in issuing the National Networks 
NPS (not finalised until December 2014: Department of Transport 2014).  A simple 
materialist reading might suggest that business elites find it easier to tolerate slower time 
frames in some sectors than others, notably major rail schemes - a broadly loss making 
industry where public finance is critical to progress - yet the failure thus far to fast-track 
decisions over airport capacity in the south-east scarcely fits this picture. 
 
A more nuanced explanation for the uneven time compression of infrastructure decision-
making, is that streamlining reforms remain difficult where particular sectoral 
development trajectories remains intensely politicised, and especially where this 
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politicisation may have electoral consequences. This may be a reflection of the sector and 
contested debates about ‘need’ (Hayden 2015), making it difficult to produce fixed 
statement of national policy (Owens 2004) but siting geography also matters, with 
development of many types having faced significant protest in rural and affluent south-
east England (Cowell and Murdoch 1999), where the political price of amenity (Gregory 
1971) can be severe. Here, finding new airport capacity has failed to secure significant 
cross-party unity, and intense conflicts in this region around HS2 are also electorally 
salient to the main political parties. We might contrast this with energy. With nuclear 
power, despite its significant complexity and risks, the main UK political parties have 
become supportive, and in siting terms new nuclear capacity has been channelled to 
existing ‘nuclear oases’, enjoying strong local support (Blowers 2009). In such 
circumstances, the streamlining of decision-making processes becomes thinkable and 
actionable. One can also see the opposite happening with on-shore wind in England, 
where the growing electoral salience of public opposition emanating from specific 
projects has led the 2015 Conservative Government to act to pass planning decisions on 
wind farms over 50MW to local planning authorities (BBC 2015). 
 
These observations return us to earlier discussions about drivers. Where governments 
judge that there is limited scope to depoliticise certain sectors, projects and/or sites, then 
we can observe limitations to the traction of otherwise influential narratives of ‘delay’ 
and crisis that are otherwise powerful drivers of infrastructural decision-making reforms. 
Overall, governments seek to balance control and flexibility, for political manoeuvre and 
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electoral reasons. It may be that in, some sectors, the sense of needing a longer debating 
and detailing period is widely shared, and serves a non-negotiable legitimising purpose 
 
Our research also provides a useful evidence base for a more refined analysis of the 
construction and deployment of ‘delay’ discourses in major infrastructure. It is important 
to realise that delay discourses are constructed, and constructed far more intensely in 
some sectors than in others. Thus the  discourse of ‘delay’ around airport capacity in 
south-east England is not ubiquitous, with less evidence of a delay narrative being 
constructed in relation to HS2, as with Thameslink or Crossrail, even though these were 
schemes with extremely lengthy gestation and approval periods. Outside academia, 
however, counter discourses that assert the positive value of having longer periods of 
deliberation have become hard to find in the UK (though see Mount 2015), though 
conditions remain more conducive elsewhere in Europe (see for example BMVBS 2012; 
Conseil d’Etat 2011). What we can see is the wider strategic deployment of delay 
discourses by project opponents. For example, the ongoing difficulties of the Hinkley C 
nuclear power station–have seen critics representing delay as endemic to nuclear energy, 
and one further reason to discount the contribution of nuclear power to swiftly delivering 
a decarbonised energy system.8 Yet in so doing, the power of a master discourse of 
‘delivery’ and the need for timeliness is reinforced.  
 
 
6.0 Conclusions 
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Our analysis of the decision times for major infrastructure has helped to broaden 
understanding of the temporalities of this much contested area of public policy, and 
indicated how research can expand the focus of debate beyond the often binary political 
discourses calling for ‘quicker decisions’ or ‘more public engagement’. We show that 
decision-times, for most infrastructure projects, have not changed significantly in recent 
decades, but there is a more marked redistribution of time between different components 
of decision-making processes, and the uneven regulation of time frames between projects 
and sectors. This helps to reveal the balance of power between actors as well as the 
uneven traction of economic arguments for streamlining and depoliticisation. There is, of 
course, a need to replicate such research on other infrastructure categories; renewable 
energy being a prime contender. There is also an urgency to this, as in the UK and other 
countries downward pressures on decision-making time frames are unrelenting (see 
White 2013). 
 
While our data has its limitations, our inclusion of an array of projects, 117 in total, 
shows how a focus on specific ‘exceptional’ projects like Heathrow T5 can misrepresent 
what is happening to decision times across a wider gamut of infrastructure. Similarly, 
whatever the uncertain merits of public inquiries as a mode of public engagement and 
evidence investigation, it is clear that their duration only rarely significantly shaped the 
overall time frames for most infrastructure projects. Only for Hinkley C might one 
conclude that the 2008 Act procedures reduced decision times because it was subjected to 
a shorter public examination: but issues addressed previously within nuclear power 
station public inquiries have unfolded instead in other arenas.  
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A number of implications arise from our results, with relevance beyond the UK case. The 
first is to consider whether conceptions of ‘moral hazard’ can help to evaluate these 
trends. Applied most visibly to bank bail outs, the concept may have some purchase on 
institutional arrangements in which project proponents can put forward more 
controversial and risky schemes, in sensitive locations, in the belief that one of the 
potential penalties of such behaviour – a protracted decision-making process – has been 
delimited by the state. Questions arise about the quality of scrutiny in time-trammelled 
processes and the possibility of transfers of risks. Actor dimensions warrant closer 
analysis, too, such as the performance of different actors within ‘streamlined’ apertures 
and in arenas outside formal planning mechanisms; the scope of different actors to 
influence overarching policies and the ‘rules of the game’; and how Parliamentary 
scrutiny – often held up as the ‘right place’ to debate infrastructural need – performs in 
this regard (see discussion in Mount 2015). 
 
A second implication is that if ‘speed up’ reforms tend to redistribute time between 
processes and actors rather than reduce overall decision times, then it ought to make it 
easier to argue that the time could be re-allocated in more productive and creative ways. 
After all, if there has been little change in overall delivery time for major infrastructure 
then this is one less reason to curtail the use of more open and potentially deliberative 
processes.  ‘Flexible’ approaches to the treatment of ‘end of the pipe controversies’ called 
for by Hajer (2003), allowing more reflexivity between site specific issues and wider 
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policy direction, or less restricted ex ante deliberations suggested by Fourniau (2012), 
offer alternative pathways. 
 
A further implication concerns the need to specify and elevate the public value of wider 
deliberative processes, in a political environment where discourses of ‘infrastructure 
delivery’ readily drown out wider questions of ends, and managerial reforms readily 
badge such questioning as ‘delay’. A case can be made that containing and accelerating 
planning processes for major infrastructure development is an under-considered 
dimension of socio-technical lock-in to particular development pathways (Unruh 2000), 
and has been applied most forcefully (albeit unevenly) to precisely those infrastructures 
where societal questions of sustainability are most profound. There are vital but 
unexplored connections between literatures on infrastructure, planning and sustainability 
transitions.  
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Table 1: Timetabled stages of the infrastructure consenting process 
 
Stage of process Duration Where prescribed 
To decide to accept application 
for Development Consent Order 
28 days Legislation: Section 55(2) of the 2008 Act 
For relevant representations to be 
lodged 
Not less than 28 
days 
Legislation: Section 56(a) and 56(5) of the 2008 
Act 
Period for the examining body to 
identify initial issues 
21 days Guidance (DCLG 2013)  
Notice of preliminary meeting of 
the Examination 
21 days  
Examination 6 months Legislation: Section 98(1) of the 2008 Act 
Planning Inspectorate to issue 
report 
3 months Legislation: Section 98(3) of the 2008 Act 
Secretary of State to issue 
decision 
3 months Legislation: Section 139 of the Localism Act 
2011, amending the 2008 Act. 
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Table 2: Analysis of cases under Transport and Works Act 1992 now falling under 
Planning Act 2008 regime (reproduced with permission from Hemming 2012)9 
 
 Number of 
cases 
Average time to 
decision (years) 
Number to 
public inquiry 
Number refused 
All applications 20 2.2 11 2 
Applications 
since 2000 
8 1.9 7 0 
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Table 3: Decision process and times for major rail schemes 
 
Scheme Formulation and 
previous  
application 
Submission of 
Application 
Consent Opening Key Planning 
Challenges 
Time from 
announcement 
to opening 
Channel 
Tunnel Rail 
Link 
Route announced 
1989 
Hybrid Bill 
submitted 
November 
1994 
Royal Assent 
December 
1996 
Route to 
London St 
Pancras 
November 
2007 
Discussions 
over route 
through Kent 
and steering it 
to more 
acceptable 
areas, early 
1990s 
25 months (28 
years) 
Crossrail Conceived 1941, 
1974, or Central 
London Rail 
Study of 1989; 
previous consent 
attempts through 
Private Members 
Bill, Transport & 
Works Act 
Hybrid Bill 
submitted 
February 2005 
Royal Assent 
July 2008 
2018 Few major 
planning 
challenges 
41 months (29 
years) 
Thameslink Formulated late 
1980s, consent 
attempt through 
Private Members 
Bill 
Transport and 
Works Act 
order submitted 
November 
1997, amended 
1999; public 
inquiries June 
2000 to May 
2001, a second 
in 2005 
Planning 
permission 
granted 
October 2006 
2018 Heritage 
impacts around 
Borough 
Market 
108 months (29 
years) 
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Figure 1:   Analysis of post-2000 Transport and Works Act 1992 cases involving 
public inquiry (reproduced with permission from Hemming2012) 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Analysis of small transport schemes decided under Planning Act 2008 (to 
September 2014) 
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Figure 4: Decision times for Combined-Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGTs) 1988-2015 
 
 
Notes: data compiled from CCGT projects that have proceeded from application to consent, 
setting aside those that were withdrawn before consent was issued. It does not include 
applications to vary consent made after initial project was consented, though it does include in 
time calculations where variations where made to initial application before that application was 
concluded. Early applications (Corby, Peterborough, Roosecote, Great Yarmouth, Brigg, 
Fellside) were consented by the local planning authority under the Town and Country Planning 
Acts (1971 then 1990).  ‘Minus’ figures is time taken in pre-application parts of the 
planning process, such that the ‘0’ marks the point of application. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 White (2013) points to the large numbers of local planning authorities affected, which would make other 
procedures highly complex. 
2 At the time of writing (August 2015), it had not in fact been confirmed that Hinkley C would go ahead. 
3Both Sizewell B and Hinkley C projects have been represented as the vanguard of a larger 
expansion of nuclear power for Sizewell B, see David Howell, statement to the House of 
Commons 18th December 1979), and one should note that an earlier Hinkley C nuclear power 
station did in fact receive consent, relatively swiftly, in 1990, only to be abandoned. 
4Data covers period from 1988 (when, for a period, some non-CEGB promoted power stations 
were determined by local planning authorities), until August 2015, covering applications under 
Section 36 of the Electricity Act 1989 and those under the 2008/2011 Acts which have begun to 
supersede the 1989 Act procedures. As the account makes clear, data on pre-application 
discussion times can be measured with some consistency after the 2008 Act but not under 
previous procedures. For this, we rely on data collected by Cowell 91995) for the period up until 
the end of 1994, and then data is not available until the arrival of cases under the 2008 Act. The 
data set also does not include projects that were refused consent or otherwise abandoned. 93 
project decision times are therefore plotted in Figure 4 
5This average is generated from the 22 cases where application files and interviews give some 
indication of the start of pre-application discussions with local planning authorities; to avoid 
undue distortion it does not include those where there is no evidence of any such consultation, 
rather than in all cases counting this as zero months.  
6By timing pre-application periods under the 2008 Act from the first meeting with the Planning 
Inspectorate we would acknowledge that this is measuring the whole period, informal and formal, 
with formal pre-application procedures defined by invoking Section 46 of the 2008 Act.  
7In principle, the 2008 Act procedure offers greater scope for associated development connected 
to nationally important infrastructure to be considered at the same time as the main project 
application. 
8See for example http://www.jonathonporritt.com/blog/hinkley-point-beginning-end accessed 
13th March 2015. 
9At http://www.dft.gov.uk/publications/two-applications/ consulted on 2nd October 2012. 
